Michigan Law Review
Volume 51

Issue 7

1953

NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF CARE-LIABILITY OF STATE MENTAL
HOSPITAL FOR ACTS OF A DANGEROUS PATIENT AFTER
IMPROPER DISCHARGE
Edgar A. Strause S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Edgar A. Strause S.Ed., NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF CARE-LIABILITY OF STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL FOR ACTS
OF A DANGEROUS PATIENT AFTER IMPROPER DISCHARGE, 51 MICH. L. REV. 1097 (1953).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol51/iss7/17

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1953]

RECENT DECISIONS

1097

NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF CARE-LIABILITY OF STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL
FoR Acrs OF A DANGEROUS PATIENT AFTER IMPROPER DISCHARGE-One Jones,
a mental incompetent, was erroneously released as "recovered" from a state hospital for the criminal insane, after having been transferred there because of his
dangerous behavior at a state penal institution. Jones' frequent assaultive behavior at the hospital was not reported in his case history upon which the determination of his recovery was partially based, nor was any inquiry made into the
motivation for such conduct. Crowded conditions and an inadequate psychiatric
staff were responsible for the improper diagnosis of the patient's condition and
his ultimate discharge. Four days after his release he killed four persons. The
administratrix of the estate of one of the decedents sued for wrongful death,
asserting negligence in the release of Jones. Held, judgment for the plaintiff.
Having knowledge of the incompetent's dangerous tendencies, the state had the
duty to follow ordinary psychiatric procedure in determining the propriety of
the patient's release. By reason of its failure in this respect the state was negligent and thus liable for the death caused by the released inmate. 1 St. George
v. State, 118 N. Y. S. (2d) 596 (1953).
The principal case is an important judicial step in negligence law, there
apparently being no prior case imposing liability on a hospital for injuries caused
by a mental patient who was released because of an improper evaluation of his
condition.2 An analysis of this new development would seem to depend upon
the source of meaning of the artful term "duty,'' and the effect of social policy
in the recognition of a new duty here. The Palsgraf case3 developed the concept
of a relative duty, the prevailing judicial view, the majority holding that the
existence of a "duty" depends on the foreseeability of harm to the specific plaintiff in fact injured as a result of the defendant's conduct. However, concentration upon the element of foreseeability as the sole determinant of duty is not
likely to stabilize judgment here since judges may reasonably reach different
1 For a discussion of the theories of immunity of state charitable hospitals from tort
liability, see Scott, ''Tort Liability of Hospitals," 17 TENN. L. REv. 838 (1943); 25 N.Y.
Umv. L. REv. 612 (1950); 51 MxcH. L. REv. 309 (1952). See also, 26 AM. }OR., Hospitals and Asylums §13 (1940); 41 C.J.S., Hospitals §8 (1944). New York, however, has
waived its immunity. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Code (Cahill-Parsons 1946), Court of Claims Act §8.
2 However, a prior New York case held the state liable for injuries sustained by a
woman assaulted by a dangerous mental patient after his escape. Weihs v. State, 40 N.Y.S.
(2d) 283 (1943), affd. 267 App. Div. 233, 45 N.Y.S. (2d) 542 (1943). Similar liability
was found with respect to injuries caused a visitor by an insane inmate of a mental hospital,
Joachim v. State, 180 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S. (2d) 167 (1943); and for injuries sustained by
a mental patient as a result of exposure after she escaped, Callahan v. State, 179 Misc. 781,
40 N.Y.S. (2d) 109 (1943), affirmed 266 App. Div. 1054, 46 N.Y.S. (2d) 104 (1943).
Other New York cases recognize a state duty to protect patients from injury, self-inH.icted
or otherwise: Kaplan v. State, 198 Misc. 62, 95 N.Y.S. (2d) 890 (1950), affd. 277 App.
Div. 1065, 100 N.Y.S. (2d) 693 (1950) (caused by malpractice of state physician); Dow
v. State, 183 Misc. 674, 50 N.Y.S. (2d) 342 (1944) (suicidal death); Gould v. State, 131
Misc. 884, 46 N.Y.S. (2d) 313 (1944) (death caused by the assault of another patient).
For a collection of cases regarding the liability of private hospitals, see 39 A.L.R. 1433
(1925); 124 A.L.R. 202 (1940).
3 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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conclusions.4 Thus, either a determination that no legal duty was owed to this
plaintiff, or to any other person on the theory that it was not foreseeable that
harm would result to any particular person,5 or a judgment that all persons with
whom the released patient was likely to come into contact, or all persons in the
world, were in the orbit of the danger zone, might be deemed proper. At best,
an evaluation restricted to the etymology of "foreseeability" represents only a
surface examination of this newly-conceived duty. Basically, the term "duty"
is simply used to designate the inquiry into whether or not the plaintiff's interest
is entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct. 6 No legal theory
has crystallized the real factors determinative of duty, but several of a less nebulous nature than mere foreseeability are significant in appraising the principal
case. Such considerations as the superior financial capacity of a governmental
body to sustain the loss, and more important, a policy to prevent similar future
harms may have influenced the court.7 Furthermore, constantly changing social
conditions and other factors have resulted in a marked increase in the number of
insane, presenting a substantial social problem which has long been regarded as
an appropriate area for state intervention and expenditure. 8 Isolation for reasons
of public safety is an important basis for confinement of the criminally insane in
state institutions. Thus, it seems proper to place upon the state the risk of harm
resulting from the negligent discharge of a mental patient as part of the cost of
government. The instant case may be interpreted as a judicial attempt to prompt
legislative appropriation to eradicate the evil of overcrowded conditions in state
mental institutions9 and thus eliminate the cause of an unfortunate release such
as occurred in the principal case. However, there is no apparent reason why
fault unrelated to overcrowded conditions in the release or escape of an unrecovered person should produce a different result. An important matter for future
determination is whether mental institutions, private as well as state, other than
4 PROSSER, ToRTS 185 (1941), in discussing the problem of the unforeseeable plaintiff
suggests that foreseeability is but one factor in determining the existence of a duty, and that
judgment in denning duties should not be limited by any such formula. For a developed
discussion of the need for focusing on various factors for a true understanding of the evolution of a "duty," and the presentation of those factors believed to be of operative significance,
see Green, "The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases," 28 CoL. L. REv. 1014 (i928); 29
CoL. L. REv. 255 (1929).
5 But, on the basis of Andrew's dissenting opinion in the Palsgraf case, note 3 supra,
liability extends to all persons in fact injured by the defendant's wrong.
6PRossER, ToRTS 178 (1941).
7 See Green, "The Palsgraf Case," 30 CoL. L. REv. 789 (1930), where it is said that
these factors as applied to the Palsgraf case are subject to reasonable differences in evaluation. See also, Green, "The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases," 28 CoL. L. REv. 1014
at 1034 (1928); PROSSER, ToRTS 181 (1941).
s Well-defined systems of state care have been adopted in a majority of the states,
though a few states operate under the county care method, and in still others no definite
plan of public provision has been formulated. However, from this introduction of public
care many ills and obstacles arose which are yet to be overcome. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY
!r.L IN AMERICA cc. 12, 13 at p. 271 (1946).
9 For a discussion of the extent to which existing law in each of the states guarantees
the purposes and policy behind public mental health care, see National Mental Health
Foundation, MENTAL HEALTH LAws IN BRIEF (1946).
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those for the criminally insane, will be subject to similar liability. Further, while
the principal decision is limited to a situation involving the release of a patient
of known dangerous tendencies, a duty might properly be said to exist, depending on the facts, with respect to the release of other types of mental defectives. 10
In commending the result of the principal case, it is submitted that, all factors
considered, reasonable men would agree that in this situation a "duty" exists.

Edgar A. Strause, S. Ed . .

10 It is clear that the kind of mental illness will affect the extent or nature of the duty.
See Excelsior Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. New York, 296 N.Y. 40, 69 N.E. (2d) 553 (1946),
where recovery was sought from the state for property damage caused by a fire started by
a moron, not insane or criminal, after running away from a state school for mental defectives. It was held there was no duty since it could not be reasonably anticipated that the
person's escape would result in harm to others. See also, Calabria v. New York, 289 N.Y.
613, 43 N.E. (2d) 836 (1942); Hubas v. State, 198 Misc. 130, 96 N.Y.S. (2d) 408
(1949).

